Who Is Muhammad Ali, the Man Behind the 2020 Power Sector Inquiry?
A profile of the former SECP chairman who led the most thorough investigation of Pakistani IPP corruption ever assembled, and the report he submitted that nobody in power was willing to act on
By Asad Baig · Lahore · April 2026 · Approx. 5-min read
The man behind the report
Muhammad Ali was the chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) before being asked, in early 2019, to head a nine-member committee investigating Pakistan's power sector. The committee was commissioned by Prime Minister Imran Khan as part of his anti-corruption agenda.
Over the next fifteen months, Muhammad Ali and the committee conducted what would become the most thorough documentation of Pakistani IPP corruption ever assembled. They had access to internal records of NEPRA, the Central Power Purchasing Agency (CPPA-G), and the IPPs themselves. They interviewed officials. They examined contracts. They calculated payments.
In April 2020, they submitted their 278-page report to the Prime Minister.
The report was, in subsequent assessment, the closest Pakistan came to genuine accountability on the IPP question in twenty-five years.
It was buried within weeks. As of April 2026, six years later, the full report has, to public knowledge, never been officially released.
This article profiles the man who led the work, and what makes his report's suppression particularly significant.
The professional background
Muhammad Ali had a substantive professional record before being asked to head the inquiry. He had served as chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, the country's principal securities regulator. The SECP role gave him deep familiarity with corporate financial structures, audit methodologies, and regulatory enforcement.
This was not a partisan appointment. Muhammad Ali was not a political figure. He was selected for the inquiry role because of his regulatory expertise and his perceived independence from the political-business networks the inquiry would need to investigate.
The selection was, in retrospect, well-judged. The inquiry was rigorous. The findings were specific. The recommendations were actionable.
What was less well-judged was the assumption that the inquiry's findings would be acted upon by the government that commissioned it.
What the inquiry actually found
The committee's findings, leaked in mid-2020 and corroborated repeatedly since, were summarised in earlier articles. The detailed walk-through is at The 2020 Inquiry Report That Was Buried. The headline findings:
- IPPs earning 50 to 70 percent annual profits against a 15 percent legal limit
- 16 IPPs from 1994 policy with cumulative excess returns of hundreds of billions of rupees
- 2002-policy IPPs with Rs. 64 billion in excess payments in nine years pre-2020
- Working capital scam costing billions per year (explainer)
- Capital cost over-statement across multiple plants (explainer)
- NEPRA failures across multiple regulatory functions (explainer)
- $2.5-2.6 billion in excess payments to Chinese Sahiwal and Port Qasim CPEC plants (explainer)
- Conflict-of-interest naming of senior PTI advisers including Razak Dawood and Nadeem Babar
- Recommended forensic audit and recovery of approximately Rs. 1 trillion
The findings were specific enough to support legal action. The recommendations were specific enough to be implemented. None of this required further investigation. Implementation only required political will.
That will did not exist.
The cabinet decision and its reversal
On April 21, 2020, the federal cabinet voted to publish the report. The decision was reversed within days following pressure from a "friendly country" widely believed to be China. I have written about the suppression at What "Friendly Country" Buried the 2020 Inquiry Report?.
Muhammad Ali's role ended with the submission of the report. He had no formal authority to demand publication or implementation. He had done the work he was asked to do. The political process that should have acted on his work failed.
He did not, to my knowledge, publicly campaign for the report's release in the years after its suppression. This is, in itself, a notable fact. The committee chairman who had spent fifteen months producing the most thorough documentation of Pakistani IPP corruption ever assembled chose not to fight publicly for its publication.
There are several possible reasons for this. He may have viewed the political process as outside his mandate. He may have made a personal calculation about the costs of public confrontation. He may have been advised by the institutional machinery that surrounds senior Pakistani regulatory figures.
Whatever the reason, the absence of his public advocacy meant that the report's suppression became easier to sustain. There was no senior figure with credibility on the issue publicly demanding the publication.
What the Muhammad Ali precedent tells us
The 2020 inquiry was not the first Pakistani investigation of power sector corruption. It was, however, by general professional assessment, the most thorough.
That such a thorough investigation could be conducted, submitted, voted on by cabinet for publication, and then suppressed within weeks tells us something important about the structure of Pakistani accountability.
The investigative capacity exists. Pakistan can produce rigorous, specific, actionable investigations of structural corruption. The Muhammad Ali committee proved this.
The political capacity to act on investigations does not. When the moment of confrontation arrives, the political system has consistently chosen accommodation. The 2020 episode demonstrated this in the most documented way available.
The information advantage is real but not sufficient. Even rigorous investigations, when buried, do not produce reform on their own. They require sustained political pressure, public mobilisation, and leadership willing to act on the findings.
The implication for Pakistani citizens is that information alone is not the constraint. The Muhammad Ali committee provided the information. The political class did not act. Any future reform requires not just better information but mechanisms to ensure that information leads to action.
I have written about the broader political-economy implications at my pillar on the IPP system.
WHAT THE PRECEDENT MEANS
Pakistan can produce rigorous investigations of structural corruption. Pakistani political processes can come close to genuine accountability. Both capabilities exist. What is missing is the political will to translate findings into action when foreign or domestic pressure makes accommodation easier than confrontation. Future reform requires confronting that gap, not just commissioning more reports.
What you should take away
Three things.
Muhammad Ali led the most thorough Pakistani IPP investigation ever conducted. The report exists. The findings are specific. The recommendations are actionable.
The work was suppressed within weeks. Not because the findings were weak. Because the political process chose accommodation over confrontation.
Future reform requires more than another investigation. The information has been provided. The Muhammad Ali committee's work is the foundation. What is needed now is political will to act on the existing findings, not new findings.
Now you know who he is. Pass it on.
Thank you for reading.
, Asad Baig, Lahore, April 2026
Frequently asked questions
Who is Muhammad Ali in the context of Pakistani power sector reform? Muhammad Ali is the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP). He led the nine-member committee commissioned by Prime Minister Imran Khan in early 2019 to investigate the country's power sector. The committee submitted its 278-page report in April 2020.
What did the Muhammad Ali committee actually do? Over fifteen months, the committee accessed internal records of NEPRA, CPPA-G, and the IPPs. They interviewed officials, examined contracts, and calculated payments. They produced a 278-page report documenting systematic excess profits, capital cost over-statement, regulatory failures, and naming specific officials as conflict-of-interest beneficiaries.
What happened to Muhammad Ali after the report was buried? He returned to other professional activities. He has not, to public knowledge, publicly campaigned for the report's release in the six years since its suppression. The committee's work effectively ended with the submission of the report; its political fate was outside his mandate.
Why has nobody else conducted a similar investigation? The Muhammad Ali committee had specific access (internal records, official cooperation) that subsequent investigators have not been able to replicate. The PTI government that commissioned the inquiry did not commission a follow-up after the suppression. The Shehbaz Sharif government has not commissioned an equivalent committee. Without comparable access, replication is difficult.
Sources and notes
- Power Sector Inquiry Report 2020 (ARY News mirror)
- Pakistan Today, Power scam report to be made public, cabinet decides (21 April 2020)
- Express Tribune, Irregularities caused over Rs4 trillion loss (April 2020)
- The News, IPPs strongly criticise head of govt's committee (April 2020)
- Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, public records on past chairmen
Related reading from Asad Baig
The cluster post this answers under
The pillar
Sibling long-tail explainers
- What "Friendly Country" Buried the 2020 Power Sector Inquiry Report?
- Why Were the 1994 IPP Contracts Signed in US Dollars?
Asad Baig