Nadeem Babar: The Architect Inside, and the Oursun Solar Tariff
How a former Wall Street banker who founded Orient Power was appointed by Imran Khan to reform the very system he had built, and what the Oursun Solar tariff at 132 cents per unit reveals about the conflict of interest
By Asad Baig · Lahore · April 2026 · Approx. 8-min read
The figure who embodies the structural problem
If one figure in Pakistan's power sector embodies the structural conflict of interest that defined the system, it is Nadeem Babar. Not because he is the wealthiest. Not because he owns the largest plants. But because his career, more than anyone else's, perfectly maps the way private commercial interests and public policy roles have been allowed to mix in Pakistani energy governance.
This article walks through that career, in plain English, with public sources cited at every claim. It explains what was approved, what was disclosed, what was not disclosed, and why his appointment as Imran Khan's energy adviser was, in retrospect, one of the clearest signals that the PTI government's anti-corruption agenda would not survive contact with power-sector reality.
The biographical setup
Nadeem Babar trained as an investment banker at Drexel Burnham Lambert in the United States in the 1980s. After Drexel's collapse, he moved to Credit Suisse First Boston, specialising in international project finance. His professional focus was on financing power generation projects in developing economies.
In Pakistan, he developed power projects for the Coastal Power Corporation and El Paso International. By his own published biography, he had been involved in setting up over 150 power plants across 18 countries before establishing his own ventures in Pakistan.
This is real expertise. Nadeem Babar is not an inexperienced operator. He is one of the most technically qualified people in Pakistani energy. That fact makes the rest of this story more troubling, not less.
Orient Power and the 2002 framework
In 2003, Babar founded Orient Power Company under the 2002 Power Policy framework. The 2002 Power Policy whose drafting he had been involved in as an advisor to the Punjab government before establishing his own ventures.
The conflict of interest pattern was established at this beginning. The same individual was simultaneously advising the government on policy and positioned to commercially benefit from that policy once finalised.
Orient Power was followed by Saba Power, another Babar venture. Then Oursun Solar. The portfolio grew across the 2002 framework era, the 2006 renewable framework era, and into the 2010s.
The Oursun Solar tariff
In 2017 and 2018, the global price for solar electricity in competitive auctions was around 3 to 4 US cents per kilowatt-hour. India was awarding solar contracts at those rates. Saudi Arabia. Mexico. Chile. Multiple developing-country auctions delivered headline-grabbing rates of under 4 cents per kWh.
Babar's Oursun plant was approved in Pakistan at one hundred and thirty-two US cents per unit. That is 33 times the international rate.
THE OURSUN MATH
While global solar tariffs in 2017-2018 ranged from 3 to 4 US cents per kWh, Nadeem Babar's Oursun Pakistan Solar plant obtained a tariff of approximately 132 US cents per kWh under Pakistan's upfront tariff structure. This is approximately 33 times the international rate. The tariff was approved while Babar was simultaneously serving on Pakistani government advisory positions related to energy policy.
The mechanism that allowed this was the Pakistani upfront tariff structure for renewable energy, introduced under the 2006 framework. Under the upfront structure, NEPRA set tariffs for renewable plants based on assumed capital costs, assumed efficiency, and assumed risk premiums. Plants that opted into the upfront tariff received it without competitive bidding. The tariff was supposed to be calibrated to international benchmarks. In Babar's case, it was not.
Whether the upfront tariff was set without reference to international benchmarks because of regulatory failure or because of regulatory capture is a question the 2020 Power Sector Inquiry Report addressed in part. The report's findings on Oursun specifically, and on Babar's broader portfolio, were among the conflict-of-interest items that contributed to the report's suppression.
The Imran Khan appointment
Then, in 2018, came the appointment that crystallised the structural problem. Imran Khan, the politician whose entire political brand had been built on attacking IPP corruption and promising to recover Rs. 1 trillion from corrupt IPP owners, appointed Nadeem Babar as Chairman of the Energy Reforms Task Force.
Subsequently, Babar was promoted to Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Petroleum.
At the moment of Babar's appointment to public office:
- Orient Power was the biggest defaulter to Sui Northern Gas Pipelines, owing Rs. 2.659 billion in unpaid gas bills
- The London Court of Arbitration had ruled against Orient Power in a billing dispute
- SNGPL had issued disconnection notices that were not enforced (a remarkable circumstance for a private company in normal commercial circumstances)
- Babar publicly claimed he had "left" Orient Power, while admitting to retaining over 25% shareholding
The man who became Imran Khan's principal energy adviser had, at the moment of his appointment, an unpaid Rs. 2.659 billion gas bill at his own company, an adverse arbitration ruling against that same company, and continuing material shareholding in the company that he claimed to have "left."
This was not a hidden problem. It was a matter of public record. The journalism of the time, including Pakistan Today / Profit's January 2019 reporting and subsequent coverage by The News, documented the situation in real time.
The PTI government appointed him anyway.
The 2020 inquiry naming
The 2020 Power Sector Inquiry Report, headed by Muhammad Ali, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, named Nadeem Babar as a direct beneficiary of the IPP payment system. He was excluded from the cabinet meeting that discussed the report due to conflict of interest. The report was subsequently buried.
This is the sequence in chronological summary:
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| 1980s | Babar trains at Drexel Burnham Lambert, Credit Suisse |
| Early 1990s | Develops projects for Coastal Power Corp, El Paso International |
| 2003 | Founds Orient Power under the 2002 Power Policy framework |
| 2017-2018 | Oursun Solar approved at 132 cents/kWh, ~33x international rate |
| 2018 | Appointed Chairman, Energy Reforms Task Force, then SAPM Petroleum |
| 2019 | Orient Power = biggest SNGPL defaulter (Rs. 2.659 billion) |
| April 2020 | Named as direct IPP beneficiary in the inquiry report |
| April 2020 | Excluded from cabinet meeting on the report |
| Late 2020 | Inquiry report buried under foreign pressure |
| April 2022 | PTI government falls; Babar leaves public office |
I have written about the broader inquiry story at The 2020 Inquiry Report That Was Buried.
What the Babar story actually means
I want to be clear about what is and is not being claimed here.
What is documented: Nadeem Babar simultaneously held private commercial interests in Pakistani power generation and public policy advisory positions related to the same sector. The Oursun Solar tariff was approved at multiples of the international rate. He was appointed to the PTI government's senior energy positions despite a known unpaid SNGPL bill, a known adverse arbitration ruling, and continuing material shareholding in the company he claimed to have left. The 2020 inquiry named him as a direct IPP beneficiary.
What is alleged but not legally established: That the simultaneous private and public positions enabled specific decisions favouring his commercial interests. That the Oursun tariff approval involved improper influence rather than regulatory failure. That the SNGPL non-enforcement was a function of his political position. These are the kinds of claims that would require formal investigation, evidence, and legal process to establish definitively.
The 2020 inquiry made findings about Babar's conduct that have not been further investigated because the inquiry was buried. The legal processes that might have produced definitive findings have not been initiated. We are left with a documented public record of the appointments, the commercial holdings, the inquiry naming, and the absence of subsequent action.
That documented public record is what this article describes. The intent throughout is to inform, not to defame. To document, not to attack.
What you should take away
Three things to remember about the Nadeem Babar story.
The conflict of interest was visible from the start. Babar was not a hidden conflict of interest discovered after the fact. The information about his Orient Power holdings, the SNGPL non-payment, and the London arbitration ruling was public at the time of his appointment. The PTI government appointed him anyway.
The Oursun Solar tariff at 132 cents per kWh against a global rate of 3-4 cents is among the most concrete examples of how Pakistani upfront tariff structures generated excess returns. It is also, mathematically, one of the easier-to-document cases of misalignment between Pakistani approved tariffs and international benchmarks.
The career trajectory itself is the structural problem. Investment banker, develops projects in foreign markets, returns to Pakistan, advises on policy, founds plants under that policy, gets appointed to senior public office in the same sector, gets named as conflict-of-interest beneficiary in commissioned inquiry. This is not the story of one bad individual. It is the story of an institutional culture that allowed each step in the sequence to proceed without meaningful scrutiny.
The Babar story is, in many ways, the most useful single case study for understanding why Pakistani energy reform requires more than well-intentioned new ministers. It requires reform of the appointment processes, conflict-of-interest screening, mandatory cooling-off periods, and disclosure requirements that determine who can hold what role. Without those structural reforms, every new minister will face the same temptations the previous ones faced.
Now you know the Babar story. Pass it on.
Thank you for reading.
, Asad Baig, Lahore, April 2026
Frequently asked questions
Who is Nadeem Babar? Nadeem Babar is a Pakistani investment banker and power-sector entrepreneur. He trained at Drexel Burnham Lambert and Credit Suisse First Boston. He founded Orient Power Company in 2003, Saba Power, and Oursun Solar. He served as Chairman of the Energy Reforms Task Force and Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Petroleum under the Imran Khan government (2018-2020). He was named as a direct beneficiary of IPP payments in the 2020 Power Sector Inquiry Report.
What is the Oursun Solar tariff scandal? Oursun Solar, owned by Nadeem Babar, obtained a tariff of approximately 132 US cents per kWh at a time when global solar tariffs in competitive auctions ranged from 3 to 4 cents per kWh. That is approximately 33 times the international rate. The tariff was approved under Pakistan's upfront tariff structure, while Babar was simultaneously serving on Pakistani government advisory positions related to energy policy.
Was Nadeem Babar's appointment to PTI government roles controversial? Yes. At the time of his 2018 appointment as Chairman of the Energy Reforms Task Force and Special Assistant to the Prime Minister on Petroleum, his Orient Power Company was the biggest defaulter to Sui Northern Gas Pipelines (Rs. 2.659 billion unpaid), the London Court of Arbitration had ruled against Orient Power, and Babar publicly admitted to retaining over 25% shareholding in the company he claimed to have "left."
What did the 2020 inquiry find about Nadeem Babar? The 2020 Power Sector Inquiry Report named Nadeem Babar as a direct beneficiary of the IPP payment system. He was excluded from the cabinet meeting on April 21, 2020 that discussed the report on grounds of conflict of interest. The report was subsequently buried, and no follow-up legal action was taken against the named beneficiaries.
Has Nadeem Babar faced legal consequences? No. Despite being named in the 2020 inquiry, no formal legal process has been initiated. The inquiry's recommendations have not been implemented under any government since. As of April 2026, Babar continues to be active in Pakistani energy commentary and consulting.
Sources and notes
- Power Sector Inquiry Report 2020, Government of Pakistan, headed by Muhammad Ali, former SECP Chairman (ARY News mirror)
- Pakistan Today / Profit, Energy task force chairman allegedly owes Rs. 800m to SNGPL (14 January 2019, with subsequent updates that revised the figure to Rs. 2.659 billion)
- The News, Appointment of new special assistant on petroleum triggers controversy (21 April 2019)
- Nadeem Babar's published biographical information including Energy Reforms Task Force materials
- NEPRA upfront tariff determinations for Oursun Solar (NEPRA tariff filings)
- IRENA solar auction price databases (international comparison data)
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Asad Baig